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As my colleague James Boyd White has observed,
It may look as though we are all doing the same thing, as we huddle over our
typewriters or computers, producing work called articles or books, but we are in
fact often doing very different things, and I think it is important to recognize
and value these differences, in ourselves and in others.
There are not only differences in what we write but in whom it is that
we write for. Unlike Professor White,2 I usually write as professional to
professional. Again, unlike Professor White,3 I am fairly comfortable
with "the voice and form" of the law review article.
Why do I write? Why do law professors generally write (at least those
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of Michigan. I am indebted to my friend Al Slote for calling my attention to
George Orwell's essay, Why I Write.
1. James Boyd White, Whyl Write, 53 WASH.& LEE L. REv. 1021, 1022 (1996).
2. See id. at 1035 ("I do not in the main write as professional to professional, but
as person to person, or mind to mind.").
3. See id. at 1031 ("[T]he voice and form of the typical law review article were
not congenial to me, and I could see no ready way to modify them for my purposes.").
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who do the same kind of writing I do)? I have asked myself this
question more than once. Members of my family have asked me the
same question quite a few times. It is not easy to explain why because
the answers that first come to mind don't stand up when you think about
it for a while.
I. THE REASONS THAT FIRST COME TO MIND
Young law professors have to write in order to gain tenure.4 And the
writing requirement is a much more formidable one than it was when I
began teaching in the 1950s. But that fails to explain why many law
professors continue to write long after they have acquired tenure.
One might say that law professors continue to write because they want
to attract the attention of faculty members at more prestigious law
schools. But that doesn't explain why professors who started out at top
schools, or moved there, continue to write. (To be sure, a few who
started out at the very best schools have not been productive. It is also
4. Indeed, in recent years the word has spread that young people seeking teachingjobs should "publish" in order to improve their chances of getting hired in the first place.
The competition for teaching jobs is so great and most law schools place so much
emphasis on productivity that this development is quite understandable. Nevertheless, it
may have some unfortunate consequences.
When I went into teaching some fifty years ago, it was a common pattern for young
law school graduates to practice at a major law firm for two or three years before turning
to law teaching. These young people were not expected to publish anything while they
were in practice and few, if any, did.
Today, those who follow the old route to the legal academy are at a serious
disadvantage. They must compete with those who have acquired Ph.D.s and/or J.S.D.s,
as well as the basic law degree-which means that they must compete against those who
have had much more time and opportunity to publish. (I know of at least one law school
graduate who spent six years acquiring both a Ph.D. and a J.S.D. before going on the
teaching market.) The sad truth is that the pressure to pile up billable hours is so great
that it is virtually impossible for a busy young lawyer to find the time to publish
something. For a long time, that did not matter. But it certainly matters nowadays.
I don't deny there may be a few exceptions-a few daring souls at busy law firms who
somehow will manage to set aside two or three weeks to write an article. But this will
probably do more harm than good.
It is almost impossible to write a good law review article in two or three weeks (unless
you are as old as I am and can more or less repeat yourself). Moreover, it is extremely
difficult to stand out among your peers when many of them, those working on advanced
degrees, are spending three or four or five times as many hours working on their writing
as you are on yours.
Every law faculty-and every student body-needs professors with different interests,
perspectives, backgrounds, and style. At most places nowadays there is ample room for
able people who have never even practiced law or ever wanted to do so. Indeed, some of
my most valuable colleagues have turned out to be people who never went to law school
(or might as well not have). In my judgment, however, legal education would suffer a
grievous blow if young people who were too busy practicing law to "publish" were to be
shut out of the legal academy by those who never ventured beyond the friendly confines
of the university.
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true, however, that a goodly number of our most prolific law professors
have always taught at the very best schools.)
Nor does it explain why law professors who have accomplished a
great deal in their lives and have reached the age when most sane people
retire continue to write. Why did Charles Alan Wright turn out so much
material right up to the time he died at the age of 72?5 Why had Sam
Dash completed the manuscript for a new book on search and seizure
only a few months before he died at the age of 79?6 Why does Wayne
LaFave not only continue to publish new and expanded editions of his
three multivolume treatises, but also turn out new books and articles
more than a decade after he became a professor emeritus?
7
Many years ago, when one of my children was about twelve years old,
he happened to get up in the middle of the night and notice that the light
was on in my den. He asked me what I was doing. I told him I was
working on a law review article. He asked me how much money I was
going to be paid for it and I had to tell him I wasn't going to get paid
anything. He was flabbergasted. Why, then, he wanted to know, was I
doing this.
Because it was clear to me that my remarks had confirmed my son's
suspicions that his dad was a bit goofy, and I wanted to eradicate that
impression-as well as the look of incredulity on his face-I fumbled
for an explanation. At the time, the best I could come up with was
something like this: I am being paid "indirectly." Because I would soon
be publishing a long article, I would probably get a larger raise than my
less energetic colleagues. That could mean anywhere from $2000 to
$5000 a year more in the bank.
5. Charles Alan Wright is best known as the lead author of the multivolume
Federal Practice and Procedure treatise, which spans over fifty volumes. See CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999). Wright passed
away in July 2000.
6. Samuel Dash passed away in May 2004. His book has been published
posthumously. See SAMUEL DASH, THE INTRUDERS: UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES FROM KING JOHN TO JOHN ASHCROFT (2004).
7. Wayne LaFave has been a Professor Emeritus since 1993. In the past eleven
years since taking emeritus status, he has published new and expanded editions of his
three criminal law treatises. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(2d ed. 1999); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed.
2003). In addition, since taking Emeritus status, LaFave has co-authored three new
editions of the casebook, Modem Criminal Procedure. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (8th ed. 1994, 9th ed. 1999, and 10th ed. 2002). The
11 th edition of this casebook will be published in 2005.
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I don't know whether my son believed that clumsy explanation, but I
do know that I did not believe it myself. Even if you do receive a
significantly larger raise than many of your colleagues because you have
published more, if you divide the extra raise by the number of hours you
logged producing a good-sized law review article (by that I mean doing
the research, thinking about the substance and structure of the article,
writing several drafts, making revisions, smoothing out the language,
reading and correcting the page proofs), the hourly rate is astonishingly
low.
I may be less efficient or more compulsive than most, but according to
the calculations I have done, the hourly rate comes to less than twenty-
five dollars an hour. I don't think I have to belabor the point that if
money is what you are after, you can make a lot more, and make it a lot
faster, by consulting or by teaching summer school somewhere.
8
II. IS WRITING FUN?
If there isn't much money in writing, does one get pleasure from it?
Over the years, I have heard people say that writing is fun. Indeed, at
one point during the panel discussion that constituted the basis for this
symposium, Professor Jonathan Macey said just that.
I must disagree. I do not deny that when, after many attempts and
several drafts, I have managed to say something as well as I could (and
yes, as well as I thought anybody could), I have felt a certain sense of
satisfaction. But that doesn't make writing fun. A basketball player
who guards Shaquille O'Neal as well as anybody may experience a great
sense of satisfaction, but I doubt very much that he would call guarding
"Shaq'' 'fun.,'
My colleague Steve Smith reports that, sometimes at least, he writes
"because it provides an excuse not to read: writing is sometimes more
fun or at least less painful than reading the sort of legal scholarship I
would otherwise feel obligated to read." 9 My experience has been just
the opposite. I usually spend too much time studying what others have
had to say about the general subject I am going to write about because
reading what others have to say is so much more pleasant than
hammering out what I want to say. Postponing the actual writing is
perhaps my greatest weakness as a writer.'°
8. See Steven D. Smith, Legal Scholarship as Resistance to "Science," 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1775, 1777 (2004).
9. See id. at 1776.
10. If a person who has not yet written her first law review article were to ask me
for advice, the first thing I would say is: Start writing as soon as you can. Cut to the
chase. Starting to write doesn't mean you won't do any more "research." You almost
1750
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Taking your child or grandchild to the circus may be fun. Playing
tennis on a cool summer afternoon may be fun. A lot of things may be
fun. But writing is not one of them. Writing is work and very good
writing is very hard work.
Another word about work. When people say they work sixteen or
eighteen hours a day, I can't help wondering how much time they spend
on the phone or taking part in, or simply attending, meetings. I can talk
sixteen or eighteen hours a day too. But writing-and of course I mean
serious writing-is another matter. It requires so much focus, so much
intensity, such total immersion in your work, that doing it five or six
hours a day is quite an accomplishment.
George Orwell once talked about the experience of writing a book. I
think what he had to say applies to writing a major law review article as
well. He may have exaggerated a bit, but not, I think, by very much
when he observed:
Writing a book is a horrible, exhausting struggle, like a long bout of some
painful illness. One would never undertake such a thing if one were not driven
on by some demon whom one can neither resist nor understand. For all one
knows that demon is simply the same instinct that makes a baby squall for
attention. I
III. GEORGE ORWELL'S MOTIVES FOR WRITING
As we all know, Orwell did not write law review articles (and I
suspect that most people are happy that he did not waste his talent doing
so), but some of the motives for writing he discussed strike a responsive
chord. At one point, for example, Orwell reported that his "starting
point" had often been a "a sense of injustice" and that for much of his
career he started to write a book "because there is some lie that I want to
expose," or "some fact to which I want to draw attention."'' 2
Although I was not to read Orwell's essay until many years later,
certainly will. Don't assume that you do research for a given amount of time and then do
the writing for another period of time. You will (or should) find yourself doing both,
back and forth. The best way to find holes in your argument is to start writing. The best
way to find out that you can't support something you assumed you could easily support
is to start writing. Composing your thoughts will usually cause you to do more research,
more focused research. And the additional research will often lead you to revise some of
the statements you originally made-or to add some statements you should have made in
the first place.
1I. GEORGE ORWELL, Why I Write, in THE ORWELL READER 390, 395 (1956).
12. Id. at 394.
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Orwell's comments provide a pretty good description of my motives for
writing an article attacking the pre-Gideon rule regarding when indigent
felony defendants could be furnished with appointed counsel.13 Under
this rule, often called "the Betts rule" (after the case that established the
rule) 14 or the "special circumstances" rule, an indigent defendant charged
with a serious noncapital offense, such as armed robbery, had to represent
himself unless there were "special circumstances," e.g., the defendant
was mentally handicapped or the case was unusually complicated.
Unfortunately, in practice the state courts in those jurisdictions which
did not require the appointment of counsel in noncapital cases rarely, if
ever, bothered to find out whether the "circumstances" were "special."' 5
To use Orwell's language, the "lie" that I wanted to expose when I
wrote my right to counsel article was the lie that a trial judge (or the
prosecutor) could be counted on to protect the rights of an unrepresented
defendant. Another "lie," as I viewed it, was that a record made without
the input of any lawyer for the defense could establish that the
unrepresented defendant was not disadvantaged by the absence of
counsel. The record can "establish" no such thing. All that a record
made without a defense lawyer can do, I maintained at some length, is
fail to establish on its face that the unrepresented defendant appeared to
be disadvantaged. 16
13. See Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1963).
14. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
15. In the Gideon case itself, when the defendant, a burglary defendant, asked the
trial judge to appoint counsel for him, the judge responded that he could not do so
because under Florida law "the only time the Court can appoint [clounsel ... is when
[the defendant] is charged with a capital offense." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337 (emphasis
added).
16. What does it prove that the record reads well? How would it have read if the
defendant had had counsel? The failure of the unrepresented defendant to develop a
satisfactory theory, or if he does, to support it with adequate evidence, hardly demonstrates
that he had a "fair trial." The same may be said for the failure to discard an alibi defense
(the defense Mr. Betts used) or some other defense which is likely to do more harm than
good. For the failure to know the "law" or possess the "facts" are the probable
consequences of being without the aid of counsel inside and outside the courtroom.
One of the sad lessons a writer who lives a long life learns is that "there is no final
victory. However great the triumph, it is ephemeral. Without further struggle it withers
and dies." FRANCIS A. ALLEN, On Winning and Losing, in LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION
11, 16 (1979). Unfortunately, the once discredited Betts v. Brady has resurfaced.
A decade after Gideon, the Court held that there is no flat right to appointed counsel in
probation or parole revocations proceedings. In order to obtain appointed counsel, the
probationer or parolee facing violation of his status and a return to prison must establish
without a lawyer that there are substantial reasons that make revocation inappropriate and
that these reasons "are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present." Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
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Orwell also told us that he was often moved to write because there is
"some fact to which I want to draw attention."1 7 Once again, this rings a
bell. Once again, the right to counsel article furnishes an illustration.
I thought it important to demonstrate that the very case that established
the "special circumstances" rule, Betts v. Brady, was one in which a
lawyer for the defense would have made a difference. Both the Court
which had upheld Mr. Betts' conviction for armed robbery and the lower
courts which had dealt with the case had assumed otherwise.18  But a
long, hard look at the transcript of Mr. Betts' trial convinced me that the
case was riddled with error.
To take but one example, the robbery victim did not pick Betts out of
a lineup. The only person the victim was asked to identify was Betts-wearing
a dark coat, dark glasses, and a handkerchief around his chin. 19 Whose
coat? Whose dark glasses and handkerchief? None of these items were
ever offered into evidence. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish
that Mr. Betts ever owned a dark overcoat or a pair of dark glasses.
After reading and rereading the trial transcript many times and
studying it for a number of weeks,20 I concluded that the following
bootstraps operation occurred:
[The robbery victim] described... the various items the robber was supposed to
have worn; the police simply went out, begged or borrowed the requisite coat,
glasses and handkerchief and slapped them on Betts; [the victim] then made his
identification, based largely on the coat, glasses and handkerchief the police had
put on Betts. 21
Two decades after Gideon, the Court seemed to have suffered amnesia again when it
held that, absent special circumstances, an indigent person is not entitled to appointed
counsel when the state seeks to terminate her parental rights. The Court told us, on the
basis of a record made without the assistance of counsel, that "the case presented no
specially troublesome points of law, either procedural or substantive." Lassiter v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).
17. ORWELL, supra note 11, at 394.
18. "The simple issue," the Supreme Court told us, "was the veracity of the
testimony for the State and that for the defendant." Betts, 316 U.S. at 472. In denying
Mr. Betts collateral relief, the state court had similarly concluded: "[I1n this case it must
be said there was little for counsel to do on either side." Trial Record at 30, Betts v.
Brady, quoted in Kamisar, supra note 13, at 42.
19. See Kamisar, supra note 13, at 43, 48-49.
20. I was able to take this much time because I was an academic, not a practicing
lawyer. I didn't have to worry about how many hours I could bill. I could proceed on
the basis that I had all the time in the world. (More about this later.)
21. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 49.
1753
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According to Orwell, one of the "great motives" for writing is:
Political purpose-using the word "political" in the widest possible sense.
Desire to push the world in a certain direction, to alter other people's idea of the
kind of society that they should strive after.22
Modifying Orwell's language a bit, I would have to say that a desire to
alter people's ideas about the kind of criminal justice system they should
strive after-especially the ideas held by people on the bench-has often
been one of my motives.23 Of course, there are many people who have
very different ideas about the kind of criminal justice system we ought to
have. This means that people who have strong views about the subject
are likely to get involved in what might be called "the politics of
'crime'" or the "politics of 'law and order.''
Because statistics have an almost magical appeal in a "fact"-minded
culture such as ours, and, as renowned criminologist Lloyd Ohlin once
observed, statistics are especially powerful when "they give a sense of
solid reality (usually false) to something people vaguely apprehend,, 24 it
is hardly surprising that "get-tough" politicians have long used (or
should one say, misused?) statistics to prove that crime is "overwhelming
our society" and that "criminal-coddling" courts and "soft-on-crime"
liberals are largely to blame.25
If I had to limit myself to one example, I would point to the tactics of
Senator John McClellan, who chaired the Senate subcommittee hearings
on a bill, which, among other things, purported to repeal Miranda v.
Arizona.26 When McClellan urged the need for and desirability of such
22. ORWELL, supra note 11, at 392-93.
23. I share the view that you cannot expect to convince even a single justice to
adopt your position when you write a law review article "demonstrating a right to a
minimum income, or to the lifestyle of your choice." Smith, supra note 8, at 1778. But I
have always believed that the right law review article can have a significant impact on
the courts when more "incremental" matters are at issue.
24. See Yale Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse-and Fight Back with-Crime
Statistics, 25 OrLA. L. REV. 239, 239 (1972) (quoting Lloyd Ohlin); see also Lloyd E.
Ohlin, The Effect of Social Change on Crime and Law Enforcement, 43 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 834, 834 (1967-1968).
25. For articles maintaining or rejecting the view that the courts have had a major
impact on the crime rate, see, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on
Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327
(1997); John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1147 (1998); Fred E. Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The
Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 85 (1962); Kamisar,
supra note 24; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda is Unjustified-and Harmful, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347 (1997).
26. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The anti-Miranda provision, which became part of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, was struck down two decades
later in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). A 7-2 majority reminded the
Congress that it "may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying
the Constitution." Id. at 437.
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legislation, he-
propped up in the rear of the Senate chamber a huge facsimile of the F.B.I.'s
crime graph. The titles of key Supreme Court decisions were marked at the
peaks along the rising line, to show the embarrassing parallel between Supreme
Court activity on behalf of defendants and the crime rise.
27
Senator McClellan then declared:
[The] tone is set at the top. The Supreme Court has set a low tone in law
enforcement, and we are reaping the whirlwind today. Look at [the crime
graph] chart. Look at it and weep for your country. Crime spiraling upward
and upward and upward.28
To use Orwell's language one last time, again and again the use of
crime statistics to frighten the public and to influence the judicial and
legislative branches has turned out to be a lie (or at least, a misleading
tactic)-one that people interested in the politics of crime should feel the
urge to expose. Law professors may not have any special training in
statistics. I certainly do not and I doubt that many who have written
about the subject do, but here as elsewhere, whether the topic that
becomes relevant is cost-benefit analysis or legal history or psychology
or statistics, good writers should not give their opponents a free pass.
Good writers do what has to be done.
To reach his full potential, it appears, a football player must constantly
work out in the weight room. To fulfill their potential, it seems, legal
writers must constantly educate themselves. They need not (and probably
cannot) become historians or psychologists or criminologists, but they
must educate themselves well enough to avoid being misled or confused
or intimidated by arguments based on history or criminology or
whatever. Good legal writers must educate themselves well enough to
recognize-and to expose-lies or misleading arguments based on
another discipline.
Collaboration with someone in another field is undoubtedly useful, but
for one reason or another, such arrangements are often not feasible.
Professor Donohue seems to have a special background and interest in
statistics, but I had no idea he did until he decided to take issue with an
empirical study maintaining that Miranda has had a significantly adverse
and long-term effect on clearance rates for both violent and property
27. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 12 (1970).
28. 114 CONG. REC. 14,146 (1968).
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crimes.29  I think Donohue's response to this claim is an important
contribution to the "crime statistics" literature. 30 But where was he in
the early 1960s when I first began writing about the subject? 31 When I
really needed him? (Well, I figured out where he was-in elementary
school.)
IV. WHY LAW PROFESSORS SHOULD WRITE
As noted earlier,32 I am of the view that every law faculty should
include a significant number of people who practiced law for a few
years. It is not only because such people can bring certain insights to
bear in their teaching and writing. It is also because I believe that such
people are more likely to appreciate fully the many favorable conditions
under which a writer in the legal academy works.
Even in the best of law firms (and I think I worked in one of them) it
is not unusual for a young lawyer to discover that there simply is not
enough time (or that the client cannot afford to pay for enough time) to
research a point thoroughly. I am well aware that I practiced a long time
ago, but if anything, I suspect the situation is worse today.
Law professors, on the other hand, do not have to worry about billable
hours. They can think through and research exhaustively every problem
or cluster of problems they meet along the way. The distance between
professors and practitioners grows still wider when one remembers that
practicing lawyers are not awarded research leave or summer grants in
order to write.
Nor is that all. Law professors usually have access to much better
libraries than their counterparts in practice. I can recall at least a dozen
instances when law school research librarians dug up material for me
that I thought could never be found. Further, it is not unusual for law
professors to show drafts of their work to three or four colleagues and to
receive helpful comments in return. Indeed, it is not unusual for law
professors to send drafts of their work to people on other law faculties
who teach in the same field. Moreover, in order to pick up helpful
29. See Donohue, supra note 25, at 1151-80.
30. See id. Donohue pointed out that the empirical study he was evaluating
showed no significant relationship between Miranda and the clearance rate for
murder-the most accurately reported crime. Id. at 1151-56. He suggested that Miranda's
only real impact upon clearance rates may be that it prevents the police from obtaining
information from custodial suspects about crimes other than those for which the suspects
have been arrested.
31. See Yale Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the
Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1963-1964); Yale Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual
Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
171, 184-93 (1962).
32. See supra note 4.
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criticism, a growing number of law professors present drafts of their
work at various workshops held around the country.
Whenever I feel a bit discomfited and overworked, I cheer up by
reminding myself of an incident that occurred while I was a second-year
associate at Covington & Burling. The firm encouraged young lawyers
to represent indigent criminal defendants on appeal. So one day I found
myself trying to overturn the drug conviction of one Warren Williams.33
Mr. Williams was illegally arrested on the street, ordered into a police
car, and taken to a precinct building. As he was being led through a
corridor to a room where arrestees are booked and thoroughly searched,
Williams dropped a cigarette package containing heroin capsules to the
floor. But his attempt to rid himself of the incriminating evidence before
being searched failed. An officer walking behind him picked up the
package and asked him what it was. Mr. Williams readily admitted that
the package contained heroin.34
The district court denied the motion to suppress the heroin on the
ground that Williams had "abandoned" it. I was fairly confident that I
could convince the Court of Appeals that the heroin capsules should
have been excluded as the "fruit" of the illegal arrest, i.e., the "throwing
away" of the evidence was fatally tainted by the immediately preceding
illegal arrest. But as I was preparing for the oral argument I thought of a
new issue (or a potential issue): What if the government were to argue
that even if the heroin capsules had been erroneously admitted, that
ruling was "harmless error" because the defendant had voluntarily
confessed that the package he was carrying contained cocaine?
I rushed into the library only to discover that since the 1880 case of
Balbo v. People,35 the prevailing view was that the illegality of an arrest,
or an immediately preceding search, did not affect the admissibility of a
voluntary statement. I only had a day and a half to research the point,
but the more research I did, the more I found cases against me.
It was clear that Williams' incriminating statement was voluntary.
One might argue that Williams' statement had been coerced by the
illegal arrest, but that argument seemed quite strained. Moreover, so far
33. See Williams v. United States, 237 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
34. See the discussion of the case in Yale Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures
and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of
Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L. F. 78, 127 n.224.
35. Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484, 498-500 (1880). See generally Kamisar, supra
note 34.
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as I could tell, the courts had rejected it every time it had been made. I
felt helpless.
Fortunately, the government never made the argument I feared so
much. Therefore, the case turned solely on the admissibility of the
physical evidence itself and on that issue I prevailed. But I never forgot
the Balbo rule and the sick feeling it had given me.
I thought the Balbo rule was wrong. Perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that I felt the Balbo rule was wrong. I felt that verbal
evidence obtained from an illegally arrested person or from a person
who had been illegally searched should be excluded as the fruit of the
preceding illegality, just as physical evidence found on the person of an
illegally arrested person is excluded. But I knew that I would have lost
that argument if I had had to make it.
Five years later, when I was a young professor at the University of
Minnesota Law School, I revisited the old Balbo rule. Now I had the
time to research the subject to the last drop--for example, to trace the
history and development of the Balbo rule and the history and
development of more recent doctrines inconsistent with that rule. Now
every time I encountered a problem, I had the time to think it through to
the end. Now I could write draft after draft of an article on the subject
until I was completely satisfied with it-no matter how long it took. (It
took seven months.) 36
When I wrote that article I wasn't any smarter than I had been five
years earlier. But I could think about and write about the Balbo rule under
more favorable conditions-under quite comfortable conditions-under
working conditions that thousands of busy, hurried practitioners would
greatly envy.
That strikes me as a very good reason why law professors should
write.
36. With all immodesty, I both hoped and expected that my article would
contribute to the eventual toppling of the Balbo rule, but I thought it would take another
ten or twenty years for the rule to fall. As it turned out, it only took another two years.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), stating that, under certain
circumstances at least, "verbal evidence" which derives from an unlawful entry or an
illegal arrest is "no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than the more common tangible
fruits of the unwarranted intrusion." My article is cited at this point. Of course, this is
what many law professors live for.
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